publication of a libelous statement. 7 This rule decreases the burden of publishers fighting off libel suits without diminishing the remedies available to the victim.
With the rise in popularity of the World Wide Web ("Web") 8 over the past twelve years, courts are beginning to examine how to apply the single publication rule to website libel. Courts have agreed that website libel falls under the umbrella of the single publication rule because the Web is a form of mass publication. 9 However, in implementing this rule, courts have skewed the single publication rule to favor publishers by broadly defining when publication on the Web occurs and narrowing the circumstances when republication can be found. As a result, courts have unnecessarily diminished the opportunity for libel victims to be compensated.
This Comment proposes new standards for finding initial publication and republication on the Web to maintain a balance between protecting libel victims and not hindering website publishing or the growth of the Web. Part I provides a broad introduction to libel law and discusses the scope of the single publication rule. It introduces the issue of website libel and discusses the three cases that have examined the issue. Part II examines some of the problems that arise from the current approach courts have taken in determining when initial publication and republication occur on the Web. Part III contends that initial publication should be found to occur when the intended audience of the libelous statement has a reasonable opportunity to discover it.
has been republished when the statement itself is altered or when the website publisher knowingly attempts to disseminate the libelous statement to a new audience.
I. THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE AND ITS ADAPTATION TO THE WORLD WIDE WEB
This Part provides background on libel law and introduces the single publication rule. It then discusses how courts have applied the single publication doctrine to website libel and discusses some shortcomings in their analysis.
A. An Introduction to Libel Law
Defamation is the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third party.' The tort of libel is a subcategory of defamation that occurs when the defamatory statement in question is in writing or some other permanent medium," such as an electronic broadcast or a motion picture. Because the interest protected in defamation is reputational, the tort of defamation requires that the defamatory statement be communicated to someone other than the person defamed.' 3 The intentional communication of defamatory matter is known as a "publication. " ' The day that publication occurs is the "date of publication"; the statute of limitations begins to run from this date.0
When compensating a libel victim, courts strongly prefer monetary damages to injunctive relief. In fact, the Supreme Court held in 1963 that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional valid-ity."' 6 Consequently, courts generally hold that absent extraordinary circumstances, injunctions should not be issued against libelous speech." In other words, a libel victim must wait until the false statement harms her reputation and can then sue for damages before the statute of limitations expires. Ordinarily, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until harm to the victim's reputation has occurred. This Comment will show that under website libel caselaw, it is possible for the date of publication to occur before the victim's reputation is harmed, unnecessarily narrowing the window of time in which the victim can sue.
B. The Single Publication Rule
Most states follow the formulation of the single publication rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 18 Section 577A(3) states that, "Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single publication." 19 Thus, under § 577A(3), the publication of a libelous article in a magazine with a 74 (1989) (holding that the USPA does not apply in credit report libel cases and noting that the USPA "provides there is only one publication in mass communications of a single article in a newspaper or book or magazine which is distributed to more than one person" and that the USPA "was designed to protect a publisher who prints numerous copies of libelous matter, which copies are then distributed over a substantial period of time") (quotations omitted). See also Wathan v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 636 F Supp 1530,1536 (CD Ill 1986) (noting that the central purpose of the USPA is to protect those involved in the mass media, and that it therefore did not make sense to apply the USPA to a case involving the distribution of posters at a meeting that were later redistributed by one individual who was present at the meeting).
29 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A, Comment on Subsection (3).
30
See Gregoire, 81 NE2d at 47 (applying the single publication rule to book publishers to prevent the dilution of the statute of limitations).
31 See id at 48-49 (noting that, without the single publication rule, if a book containing libelous material is printed, "the Statute of Limitation would never expire so long as a copy of such book remained in stock and is made by the publisher the subject of a sale or inspection by the public"). this Comment will use New York and California caselaw as a basis for when publication occurs. 33 In these states, publication occurs on the date that the libelous statement is distributed to the public. A statement is considered to be distributed to the public when the writing is communicated to a "meaningful mass" of readers for which the publication was intended. 3 ("Under the single publication rule, publication of an integrated issue of a mass media writing occurs upon the first general distribution of the material to the public.").
35
See, for example, Stockley v AT&T Information Systems, Inc, 687 F Supp 764, 768 (ED NY 1988) (noting that the single publication rule is "designed to restrict the subject of an allegedly defamatory writing to a single cause of action that accrues when the writing is released to its intended audience"); Osmers v Parade Publications, Inc, 234 F Supp 924, 927 (SD NY 1964) (" [W] hat is really determinative is the earliest date on which the libel was substantially and effectively communicated to a meaningful mass of readers-the public for which the publication was intended, not some small segment of it"); Strick, 192 Cal Rptr at 317 (holding that publication occurs upon first general distribution of the libel to the public, with the determinative factor being "the earliest date on which the allegedly defamatory information is "substantially and effectively communicated to a meaningful mass of readers") (quotation marks omitted 240661, *3 (ED Ky) (holding that publication occurs when the libelous publication is "substantially and effectively communicated to a meaningful mass of readers").
36 See, for example, Osmers, 234 F Supp at 927 (noting a hypothetical scenario in which, if courts held that publication occurred at the time an offending publication is placed on sale, a publisher could shorten the statute of limitations by selling a few advance copies of a libelous magazine before later releasing it to the general public).
37 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A (noting that each of several communications to a third person by the same defamer is a separate publication, except for a single communication heard at the same time by two or more third persons or any one edition or broadcast of an aggregate communication, which are both single publications). See also Firth, 706 NYS2d at 841-42 (noting that republication occurs when a defamatory article is placed in a new form or edited in a different manner); Rinaldi v Viking Penguin, Inc, 438 NYS2d 496,420 NE2d 377,381 (1981) (holding that a repetition of defamation in a later edition can still give rise to a new cause of action).
38
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A, cmt d.
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[70:639 back and a year later is re-released in paperback, two publications have occurred. 39 Republication is an important part of maintaining the balance between protecting libel victim and publisher interests. Though one of the major factors adopting the single publication rule was to avoid multiple causes of action,' allowing for republication avoids giving publishers "unending immunity" for repeated publications of a libelous statement. 4 ' Allowing for republication is also based on the idea that the single publication rule should give a single cause of action when a libelous statement reaches a particular audience. If the statement reaches a new audience, then republication should occur."
C. Website Libel Caselaw
Courts have only begun to look at how to apply the single publication rule to libel on the Web. In 1999, Arizona became the first state to extend the single publication rule to the Web in a little known case, Simon v Arizona Board of Regents. 3 In Simon, a libelous statement first appeared on a newspaper's website on October 9, 1997, and then appeared the next day in the printed version of the same newspaper.' The plaintiff filed suit on October 13, 1998, four days after the statute of limitations had run on the website claim." But, because October 10, 1998 was a Saturday and October 12, 1998 was a holiday, the filing was 39 For a general discussion, see Rinaldi, 420 NE2d 377 (holding that the release of a paperback edition of a libelous book constitutes republication).
40 See notes 5 and 29 and accompanying text. 41 See Schneider v United Airline Inc, 256 Cal Rptr 71,75 (App 1989) (noting that the single publication rule was "not designed to give unending immunity for repeated publications of libelous matter").
42
See Nacinovich v Tullet & Tokoyo Forex, Inc, 1998 WL 1050971, *9 (NY Super Ct) (holding that concern regarding the preservation of the statute of limitations is unwarranted in a case involving a non-mass media publication of libelous cartoons because "the only manner in which these cartoons could have been seen again after their alleged initial publication was for someone ... to have made a knowing and conscious effort to disseminate them to third persons," in which case the single publication rule would be inapplicable because of the willful act). See also Givens, 877 F Supp at 489 (holding that an article is republished if the defendant consciously and independently reaches a new audience); Summers v The Washington Times, 1993 US Dist LEXIS 13095, *4-5 (D DC) (holding that a libeler may only face liability for republication if republication to a new audience was reasonably foreseeable); Davis, 580 F Supp at 1094 ("[A] deliberate decision to republish or active participation in implementing the republication resurrects the liability otherwise laid to rest by the statute of limitations."); Schneider, 256 Cal Rptr at 74-75 (holding that if a publication reaches a new group, the repetition justifies a new cause of action).
43 28 Med L Rep 1240 (Ariz Super Ct 1999) (discussing a libel suit brought by a college athlete against a newspaper that published, on the internet and in print on the following day, a defamatory article about the athlete's academic performance in college).
44 Id at 1242. 45 Id.
still timely if a republication had occurred on October 10, 1997, when the print edition of the newspaper was first published. 46 The court found that the single publication rule applies to website publications. Moreover, it found that the distribution of the same story in the print edition of the newspaper did not constitute republication. The statute of limitations therefore began to run on October 9, 1997, the day of publication on the newspaper's website. 4 ' Thus, the libel claim was filed four days too late.4 ' The court emphasized that the allegedly libelous article was available to the public from the time it was uploaded to the Web. The court noted that the article was available to "an unlimited number of internet users world-wide" and was accessed at least five times by Arizona computers. Thus, the article was available to both the general and Arizona public the evening it was uploaded.
Firth v New York° provides the most detailed analysis of website libel to date. The plaintiff sued more than a year after the libelous report was published on the Web, despite the fact that the statute of limitations for libel claims in New York is one year. The plaintiff argued that each day that the report was available upon the Web constituted a new publication, and thus the statute of limitations had not run." The Court of Claims found that the single publication rule applied to websites and that the claim was time-barred. 2 The decision was upheld by both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeals of New York."
Firth has proven to be a seminal case, providing the first thoughtful discussion as to why the single publication rule should apply to the Web. 
52
See id at 843.
53
See Firth, 731 NYS2d at 247, affd 775 NE2d at 467 (upholding the ruling of the Court of Claims that the single publication rule applies to internet publications and modification of unrelated portions of a website does not constitute republication).
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[70:639 ... Web site."'" It stated that a libel accessible on a website is similar to that contained in traditional mass media, but on a larger scale. 5 The court noted that such libelous websites could be viewed "by thousands, if not millions," over large geographic areas and for an indefi- Sons6' marked the start of a trend where New York repeatedly influenced the development of libel law in other states. 61 Likewise, despite not being the first state to apply the single publication rule to the Web, Firth has attracted media attention 6 ' and has given New York another opportunity to set the tone for libel doctrine throughout the country. There are, however, several shortcomings in Firth. Despite the attention the New York courts paid to whether the single publication rule should apply to the Web, they did not carefully analyze what constitutes publication on the Web. The Court of Claims noted that publication occurs when a libelous article becomes available to the public.0 However, that court and the Appellate Division concluded without explanation that publication occurred as soon as the report was placed on the Web. The Court of Appeals merely noted the lower courts' decisions and did not discuss the issue further. 5 There were also deficiencies in the courts' discussions of the date of republication. The Court of Claims and Appellate Division both concluded without explanation that republication could not occur on the Web so long as the libelous statement in question was not altered in some way.6 In a dissent in the Appellate Division, two judges questioned the high standard that had been set for finding republication. While the dissent agreed that the single publication rule should apply to website libel cases, 67 it raised the question of whether republication could occur without the report being modified. 6 In contrast with the lower courts, the New York Court of Appeals did not take a firm stance against finding republication for an unmodified libelous statement on the Web. However, it found that the "addition of unrelated information to a Web site cannot be equated with the repetition of defamatory matter in a separately published edition of a book or newspaper."" Shortly after the Court of Claims decision in Firth, the Southern District of New York decided Van Buskirk v New York Times. 0 This unpublished case dealt with a defamatory letter that was published on the Web. The court noted that under the single publication rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run again when the same material is subsequently distributed to new readers. 7 ' Although the plaintiff argued that internet publishers should not be protected by the single publication rule because they can withdraw their material at any time, 72 
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stock, it did not constitute republication." The court pointed out that the libelous statement in this situation could have been withdrawn as well, but that nevertheless, the single publication rule applied.
INITIAL PUBLICATION AND REPUBLICATION ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB
This Part first discusses the current approach of courts in determining when initial publication occurs on the Web. It argues that, under this approach, publication can occur before the libelous statement has an audience, unnecessarily shortening the victim's window of opportunity to sue. This Part next argues that the courts' consideration of republication on the Web is overly restrictive. Finally, it discusses how the courts' current approach can lead to abuse of the statute of limitations.
A. Initial Publication on the World Wide Web
The idea that publication on the Web and traditional print publishing are similar enough to merit application of the single publication rule is not controversial. The idea was suggested as early as 1996 1 and few people have spoken out against the rule's expansion to the Web."
But, aside from a brief discussion in Simon, courts have overlooked the single publication rule's requirement that the libelous work be available to the public. 6 Merely placing an article on the Web does not fulfill the requirement of public distribution because information exists on the Web that cannot be viewed by the general public. This can be due to "commercial strategies, peering disputes, network failures, misconfiguration, and occasionally, malicious intent."" Likewise, information may be viewable on the Web, but not listed in any 29, 2003) . www.cnn.com refers to the host or computer with which to connect. To actually connect to this URL, a web-browser program must convert the hostname (www.cnn.com) into numerical format. See definition of DNS online at http://www.webopedia.com/TERMID/DNS.html (visited Jan 29, 2003) ("Every time you use a domain name, therefore, a DNS service must translate the name into the corresponding IP address."). This process is similar to looking up a ZIP code from a street address. There is no requirement that a correlating name exist, so a website could instead use its numeric format, such as http://10.179.8.31. The remainder of the URL specifies how to find the specific item (ixworwa.html) on the host 10.179.8. 31 . 80 There are several uses for such a URL outside the context of trying to manipulate the statute of limitations for libel. A person may put up a personal website to which she wants only a few friends to have access. If the URL is not guessable and nobody links to the website, the website will remain completely private. Non-guessable URLs can also be used to share large amounts of data. For example, scanned photographs can take up a large amount of disk space. If a person wants to send photographs to a Hotmail user with only five megabytes of disk space, email may not be practical. That person may instead choose to put the photographs on her website and tell her friend the address. The friend can then download the photographs without email. In an online business context, non-guessable URLs can be used for email address verification. After a customer registers at a website, an email can be sent to the customer containing a unique URL. The email can ask the user to click on an URL to confirm her address. Because the website is unique, when the user clicks on it, the online business will know that the email address is valid.
81 Defamation (and thus libel) is an intentional tort, and publication thus occurs only when a libeler intentionally communicates libelous material to a third party. See note 11 and accompanying text. This Comment focuses on website publications that are intentional. There are interesting issues regarding where the line is drawn between an intentional and unintentional publication on a website. Suppose a website owner intends for a libelous website to be completely private, but the URL is discovered and made public. One could try to argue that requisite intent has been met for libel, given that the website was published on the Web and there was always a chance that the URL would be discovered.
An even harder line to draw is determining when a website publication is considered to be a mass publication under the single publication rule. If a libelous website is accessible only to registered users, how many users must be registered for the single publication rule to apply? Or is Jones's page is "public" in the sense that it is available to anyone who happens to guess its exact location. Yet it is highly unlikely that someone could, by chance, find Jones's page. Until the website is discovered, it is not conceptually different from a libelous book left on a seldomly perused bookshelf in a public library. As with the website, a possibility exists that someone will find and read the book. But given that the book is not indexed in any way and can only be found through luck, its contents have not been publicly distributed.
It seems absurd that Jones's placement of the statement in an obscure location provides Smith with a cause of action for libel. Defamation requires the defamer to communicate the defamatory statement to a third party."' In Smith's case, there exists only a potential for harm, because nobody has discovered that the website exists. But under the approach in Firth, the mere presence of the statement on the Web is public enough to start the clock on the statute of limitations for Smith's libel claim. This is problematic because the necessary element that the libel be communicated to a third party is satisfied. In other words, Smith does not have a cause of action for libel at this time, because nobody has seen the website. But if the website does gain an audience in the future and reputational harm to Smith results, the statute of limitations will already be running, diminishing Smith's window of opportunity to sue. Furthermore, this "loophole" in the single publication rule could be exploited by libelers seeking to evade suit.-
B. Republication on the World Wide Web
Under the Restatement and the USPA, republication occurs if the new publication is not part of the original edition, broadcast, or exhibition.' For example, if a libelous statement is broadcast on a radio show and the entire show is later reaired, then there are two causes of action for libel, each with its own statute of limitation.
Yet courts have been reluctant to find that a libelous statement on a website is republished when the content of the statement is unchanged. The Court of Claims in Firth dismissed the idea, writing that, "Under the single publication rule, publication occurs at the time the defamatory article is made available to the public and actual sales of the article (the equivalent of "hits" on the internet) are unnecessary." The court went on to hold that while the act of making a document available constitutes publication, "in the absence of some alteration or change in form its continued availability on the internet does not constitute a republication acting to begin the Statute of Limitations anew each day." ' Other courts have agreed. In Simon, the court even found that republication had not occurred when a libelous article that was initially published on the Web was reproduced in print.M Consequently, no matter how obscure a website is, the single publication rule applies and republication will not occur regardless of significant changes in the size or character of website viewership.
These decisions could open the door to fraud. Courts are generally reluctant to grant injunctive relief to libel victims, and instead prefer to award damages after harm has occurred.9 Given that a libel victim cannot sue before significant harm occurs, the libeler could manipulate the statute of limitations to cause significant damage without facing liability. This problem was discussed more than thirty years ago by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court held that a plaintiff could choose any publication as the single publication that represents her cause of action.0 The Court's rationale for the rule was to avoid a potential for abuse by libelers. 91 As an example, the Court stated that a publisher might print a defamatory article about a California resident and distribute a few copies in New York. The California resident might not feel an action was warranted given the small audience. After the statute of limitations had run, the publisher could then "flood California and the rest of the country with the article and ... face no threat of liability."
9 Without the Pennsylvania rule, the libel victim, in theory, would have no recourse for the damages resulting from the California distribution.
For traditional libel, this fear of abuse is not warranted. Most courts would probably treat the distribution in California as a new publication, because the second distribution reached a new audience." A court might also find that the date of distribution in California is when the statute of limitations begins to run because that is the date when the article was communicated to the California public, the relevant audience for which the publication was intended.9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's fear of abuse is justified, however, in the case of website libel if no allowance for republication is made. Suppose Alice is a prominent attorney who knows a disgruntled former classmate named Bob. On February 1, 2001, Bob creates a website claiming that Alice cheated on the Bar exam ten years earlier.
Bob tells his friends about the site, but the site is not visited often. The amount of harm to Alice's reputation may be too small at this time for Alice to sue for damages.
Once statute of limitations has run, Bob promotes the website," 5 causing the number of visitors to skyrocket. The website becomes extremely damaging to Alice, given the larger audience now viewing the statement. But despite the dramatic change in viewership for Bob's site, Alice has lost her right to sue. This is the same situation feared by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court -a libeler can work around the statute of limitations by making a token distribution of the libelous statement, in this case by way of an obscure website. The most significant reason to fear abuse in the case of website libel is a libeler's ability to change a website from a small-scale distribution to a large-scale one. If a publisher prints one thousand copies of a book containing a libelous statement, the size of the audience will be limited based on the number of books printed. To reach a larger audience, the book publisher would need to print more books, which would constitute republication. Conversely, a website publisher who publishes a libelous website does not face the same physical constraints on reaching broader audiences.6 has run); Schneider v United Airlines, Inc, 256 Cal Rptr 71, 74-75 (1989) (holding that under the USPA, the single publication rule does not include separate aggregate publications on different occasions, because such publications reach a new audience).
94 See Osmers v Parade Publications, Inc, 234 F Supp 924,927 (SD NY 1964) (holding that what is determinative for when the statute of limitation begins to run is when the libel was "effectively communicated to a meaningful mass of readers-the public for which the publication was intended, not some small segment of it"). 95 For example, Bob could submit his website to search engines, purchase banner ads on legal websites, or place ads for the website in the local paper.
96
With the exception that the website publisher may need additional resources, such as computer servers to support the increase in traffic to the website.
III. METHODS FOR DETERMINING THE DATES OF PUBLICATION AND REPUBLICATION
This Part proposes that initial publication should be found to occur when the intended audience has an opportunity to discover the libelous statement. It will suggest direct and indirect methods for determining when this occurs, such as examining website traffic data and looking at website archives. This Part then suggests that courts find republication on the Web when the libelous statement in question is somehow altered. Furthermore, courts should find republication even when the content of the libelous statement has not changed, provided that the libeler disseminates the libel to a new audience. To determine when republication has occurred, courts can utilize website traffic data and examine changes to the website where the libelous statement was published.
A. Initial Publication Should Occur When the Website Becomes Accessible to Its Intended Audience
To establish when publication occurs on the Web, courts should determine when the intended audience had a realistic opportunity to discover the libelous statement. Defamation law was built around the idea that harm to the victim begins when the defamatory statement is communicated to one or more third parties, 97 at which point publication has occurred." Thus, under general libel law, if someone makes a libelous statement and no one reads it, libel has not occurred.9
The single publication rule varies slightly from general libel law in that the date of publication is not the date that the statement was read, but rather the date when the statement was communicated to a meaningful mass of the intended audience. '° The spirit of the rule, however, is the same as for general libel law-there must be an audience to read the libel to trigger the statute of limitations. It is easy for printed libel to generate an audience, by nature of it being placed for sale, mailed, or distributed in some manner. a bookstore or discover a free magazine at a street corner newsrack.
But unless the website publisher tells other people about the website, or the website has an URL that someone discovers, the work is not available to its intended audience in any meaningful way.'°1 In most cases, a libelous statement reaches its intended audience when it is posted to the Web. If a libelous statement is placed on a website with an existing audience, the intended audience would be the viewers of the main website and the statement being uploaded to the website would constitute distribution to that audience." For websites without an existing audience," 3 it is more difficult to determine when a libelous statement is sufficiently communicated for publication to occur. However, courts have overlooked several tools they can use to determine when a website has been published for purposes of a libel suit.
1.
Using traffic data to determine when publication occurs.
The easiest way to determine when a website has reached a substantial mass of its intended audience is to look at website traffic data (if such information is kept by the website or the website's host)." 4 Traffic data comes in a variety of forms. A site may maintain statistical summaries of the number of hits or page views"' per minute, hour, and/or day. Alternatively, a website may maintain full logs of every instance in which the website server is accessed. This may contain the numerical IP address of each visitor, the time and date that they visited, and a list of pages on the site that they visited. These logs may also contain the sites from which a visitor was referred in the event 101 In the later case, the website publisher would also have to intend for the website to be public. See note 81.
102 The court in Simon recognized this when it noted that an article published on a newspaper's website was immediately available to "virtually an unlimited number of Internet users." 28 Med L Rptr at 1246 (discussing a libel suit brought by a college athlete against a newspaper that published, on the internet and in print on the following day, a defamatory article about the athlete's academic performance in college).
103 Note that the obscure website could be located off a major site. For example, if an article was placed at http://www.nytimes.com/random/misc.html, and was not linked to the main site, this could constitute an obscure website as viewers of the main site would have no means by which to discover the article. 105 See Zeff and Aronson, Advertising on the Internet at 100 (cited in note 86).
that she followed a link to the site, as opposed to typing in the URL herself')1 2. Indirect means of determining when publication occurs.
There are several indirect means of determining when initial publication of a website occurs. A court could examine when advertising for the site began, when the site became listed on a major search engine, or when the site was linked to from a visited website. Any of these situations would indicate that viewers had an opportunity to discover the libelous statement.
Another useful tool that courts could use is an archiving site such as The Internet Archive.' This website permits web users to view a page as it existed at various times in the past. An archival site may have a record of the libelous website, including the date when it was first discovered by their system for archiving. Since such archives contain only websites that are linked to other websites that the archive knows, this would establish an upper bound for the date of publication. "
B. Republication on the World Wide Web
In addition to allowing libelers effectively to use the statute of limitations to prevent suits by taking an overly restrictive view of the date of publication," courts have opened the door to fraud by finding that a libelous statement on the Web must be altered in some way to be considered republished."' To avoid this problem, courts should find that republication occurs if a website publisher knowingly disseminates a libelous statement to a new audience.
The single publication rule has never protected libelers who deliberately distribute a previously published statement material to a new audience." 2 For example, in Stella v Farley Association, Inc, a po-106 Id at 96-97. Referring to website information is useful in determining whether the public had an opportunity to learn about the existence of the libelous site. It is also useful in determining whether banner ads exist for the libelous site. ( holding that concern regarding the preservation of the statute of limitations is unwarranted in a case involving the non-mass-media publication of libelous cartoons because "the only manner in which these cartoons could have been seen again after their alleged initial publication was for litical newsletter was created to aid a candidate's campaign."' On August 17, several hundred copies of the newsletter were distributed to voters in the district by hand."' At least fifteen thousand additional copies were mailed to voters, reaching them around August 20." ' The defendants argued that the date of publication was August 17, thus rendering several libel claims against them untimely."' The court disagreed, holding that the date of publication of a newsletter "is not the date that a small percentage of the issue is distributed to readers, but rather the date when the great mass of the issue reaches those for whom the publication is intended.' ' 8 Accordingly, the court found that two separate distributions had occurred, one by hand and one by mail.
The logic of Stella should apply in cases where the publisher of a libelous website deliberately reaches a new audience. If a website initially attracts a small audience, but the size of the audience later increases, courts should investigate the intent of the publisher and find that republication occurred if the new distribution was intentional. One obvious case where republication could be found is if the publisher implements new means of advertising." 9 Starting an advertising campaign or greatly increasing spending on ads are conscious decisions intended to attract new viewers. However, absent such proof, there are two other factors that courts should consider. First, courts should look for major increases in traffic to the someone ... to have made a knowing and conscious effort to disseminate them to third persons," in which case the single publication rule would be inapplicable because of the willful act 119 A website wishing to attract more visitors may pay for various forms of advertising. One of the most common of these are "banner ads." The party desiring traffic may pay the operator of another website or a third party who acts as in intermediary to place links (often with images, etc.) to the website desiring more visitors. Since this advertising is often keyed to the number of visitors who view the advertisement or "click through" to the target website, detailed information may be available from this source. See Zeff and Aronson, Advertising on the Internet at 1-2, 11-19 (cited in note 86).
website. Second, they should look at whether the content surrounding the libelous statement has changed.
Changes in traffic.
When determining whether a libeler has attempted to reach a new audience, courts should consider whether the traffic to the website has increased substantially. Significant increases in traffic are pertinent because a distribution to the public occurs when the libelous material is "substantially and effectively communicated to a meaningful mass of readers.' ' .. If viewership of a website has historically been very low and suddenly increases by several orders of magnitude, the date of the sudden increase is the point at which the writing was truly "released" to its intended audience. In addition to signifying when a mass of readers has been reached, an increase in traffic could signal that the website owner was deliberately trying to reach a new audience through advertising or promoting the site on other websites, online bulletin boards, or other means.
While it is clear that republication occurs when the defendant has actively promoted the website, it is unclear whether republication occurs when an outside party hyperlinks to a defamatory website, allowing a new audience to view its content. For instance, Slashdot, a popular website, publishes user-submitted articles read by hundreds of thousands of viewers each day.
1 2 When an interesting link is published in an article on Slashdot, thousands of new viewers may visit a previously obscure or even unpublished website, giving the linked website a vast new audience. ' This phenomenon, known as the "Slashdot Effect," has been observed when other major websites link to a previously obscure site.' 20 No analogy to this situation exists for print libel because the number of viewers of the libelous material is limited to the number of copies the publisher makes available.
There are three possible ways to respond to this situation. The first is to find that republication has not occurred even though the ar-ticle has a new audience. A second possibility is to extend liability to the website that knowingly links to the libelous website. There are no examples of this happening in the context of defamation, but injunctions have been granted to websites linking to sites that violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). In Universal City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes," the Southern District of New York forced www.2600.com, the online version of 2600 Magazine, to remove links to websites offering DeCSS software, because the software was held to violate the DMCA. 6 This act, however, raises substantial First Amendment concerns regarding the right to report news." ' The third possibility is to have a strict liability standard for the owner of the defamatory site who knowingly publishes defamatory material. Thus, the website owner could be held liable for a second cause of action due to an outside party's hyperlink, merely for having made the material public. These three methods of liability should be further examined to determine which would best serve the interests of
